

The Black Book

Crimes of the military coup in Egypt
July 2013 - March 2018



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(TEMMUZ 2013 - MART 2018)



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Preface

Dr. Saif Eldin Abdel-Fattah

This effort, which took the title of “Black Book” documenting the policies of El-Sisi and the output of his coup regime, an important effort, especially that Sisi is trying at this time to run for presidency in a farce elections to be elected for a second term, despite all those tragedies that he has committed under many headings. He committed acts which constitute crimes and some of which are classified as treason, betrayal of the oath, and what are considered indicators of great corruption. He and his institutions strive to conceal any evidence and indicators of these misdoings and their consequences. The failures that often represent professional failure in this regime that tries to sell illusions and promote dreams.



The Black Book represents the most effective answer to all the claims of the coup d'état presided by El-Sisi, of false allegations of respect for the Constitution or human rights. Clear, blatant and explicit violations have become daily rituals practiced by the regime. His speeches and deeds constituted a systematic act that insulted every human soul and incited against it with contempt, a system that does not know any value to man or dignity. This counterrevolution, which made the coup regime in Egypt its most important tool, seems to be trying to destroy this slogan, which was held by the Egyptian revolution in January to set a strategy for radical reform.

“Decent living”, “human dignity,” “fundamental freedom” and “social justice”. In view of these four goals, they represented to counter-revolution a reminder of popular demands and aspirations for these goals. Eventually the coup regime targeted these goals with all sarcasm and contempt.

The poverty line is now devouring new numbers of the “destitute” category, which are deteriorating due to the high prices and the weakness of the pound and the manipulation of the dollar. All these aspects only affect the poor, expressing the worst case, and the deterioration of the meaning of “living”.

As for the meaning of human dignity targeted by the system, in a black book that does not appreciate the meaning and sanctity of humanity, as well as the loss of dignity in all its forms and all its requirements and conditions, the waste of humanity and the obliteration of dignity are two processes carried out by the coup regime in a systematic manner.

The cheapest thing in the light of high prices is the human being whose energy was eroded and dignity was deprived and his humanity is violated by killing, to the extent that death sentences became strategic options adopted by this regime. The Egyptian citizen's vision of himself, whether he is persecuted or detained, under a regime that makes the indictment the rule and innocence is the exception expresses the misery of the citizen who lacks the meaning of his humanity and the significance of his dignity.

The lack of human dignity and humanity, if it happens and becomes a method and policy, nobody should speak of "freedom," neither fundamental nor civil nor political. Freedom is a noble and ethical act of God's creation of man. By making him free in his choices and self-determination.

Then comes the misappropriation within the justice system. The coup regime has dispelled all that is related to

the authority of justice and its functions in the administration of justice. It is indeed regrettable that this was replaced by policies of injustice. The state of injustice is either directly contributing to the issuance of unjust or indirect judgments by keeping silent towards every act of injustice committed by El-Sisi and his clerics. If you talk about the Prosecutor General's office, it became a body that does not carry out its original investigation and scrutiny but provides cover for every act of injustice.

Moreover, the judicial system has lost any spirit of legislation related to the promotion of justice and ensure that it is achieved and legislations has become legalization for injustice and grievances. It is needless to say that the regime does not aim at achieving justice and devotes all manifestations of injustice. It makes the rich get richer and the poor grow poorer, and those who fall below the poverty line are increasing daily as a sign of continuous injustice and misallocation of resources.

All this means that these four components of the slogan of the revolution were deliberately despised, and it appeared to be worse than what they were during the time of the deposed Mubarak. In this regard, we can confirm that

this coup regime destroyed everything related to Egyptian citizen's humanity, dignity, health and well-being.

In this context, it seems to us that what the Black Book offers, although it is not exhaustive but to reflect in all fields, the worst level reached by people in Egypt and lowest level of citizenship. This coup regime could establish a republic of fear and society of intimidation and exercised the policies of impoverishment and starvation. All areas related to the lives of people and citizens have been destroyed and the military has taken control of all areas of politics, economy and civil life, all subject to his will and under his command.

Therefore, our duty towards this corrupt fascist regime is that we must act against it by resisting not to let it try to control Egypt. This coup leader attempts to continue humiliating Egyptian people by running for second term in office. We must prepare evidence for its indictment and trial. The list of crimes committed against the Egyptians include killing, kidnapping and arrest of thousands, such crimes require trial of this regime and its zealotry. Moreover, the report of Human Rights Watch, of the regime's violations of systematic torture, this report can serve as a basis for the trial of El-Sisi regime, as well as a report from the UN body

“Committee against Torture” of the United Nations.

It is important to know what El-Sisi and his coup regime have done in the files of human rights, freedoms, politics, constitution, legislation, services, agriculture, industry, economy , tourism, culture, health and education. In every field, El-Sisi has a fictional national project that reflect only the falsification and forgery. Not only did he renounce Egyptian lands but also Nile water and natural gas. It is important for any individual or citizen of Egypt to face the deliberate sabotage of this regime and its brutal fascist and corrupt policies. This nation is called upon by its noble sons: saving this homeland has become a duty for its people.

Dr. Seif Abdel-Fattah



Foreword

By: *Mohamed El Feky*

Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament Abroad

This book comes with dozens of evidence and proof of the failure of the coup d'état to manage all the files of the Egyptian state, and provides an account statement and indictment list in a systematic way with scientific evidence of the disastrous results brought to us by a regime that usurped power and has monopolized it for more than four years. It is time the people hold the coup regime and its police system, that completely suffers of lack legitimacy from day one, accountable for it is involved in killing people, confiscating their will and wasting their potentials.

Surprisingly, this tyrant demands his continuation and re-election to rule again, knowing that he must be tried in the name of the people, not to be falsely and forcibly

ruling, and to take his due punishment before he destroys the country and undermines its foundations.

The name of the Black Book was chosen because, although it was repeated in many countries, it became the corresponding title and was a sign of this type of book that deals with exposing proxy, failed and corrupt regimes that have committed genocides against the people.

Many academics, scholars and experts have been involved in writing of this book, discussed by dozens of parliamentarians and politicians.

The book discusses the following axes:

First: Human Rights:

The Egyptian coup d'état disrupted the constitution, kidnapped the president of the country, imprisoned dissidents, wasted all rights and liberties, and declared the repressive police state. Egypt witnessed with El-Sisi its worst era of attacks on civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Egyptians no longer have the right to freedom of expression or peaceful assembly. The independence of the judiciary and law has collapsed and human rights legislations have been manipulated.

Second: Corrupting political life:

The coup d'état brought to Egypt a new, more radical and violent era of nepotism and a setback in political corruption than the end of the Mubarak era. Where politics was buried alive along with the freedom in Egypt.

Third: Constitutional and legislative failure:

Despite the flaw in the constitution of the coup d'état of 2014, it has been overrun by both procedures and legislations, and the most important legislation that contravenes the constitution of the coup d'état (the law of protest law - the anti-terrorism law - the law of terrorist entities).

Fourth: Critical files management and national security issues:

The past five years have witnessed deterioration and failure in the management of national security files. The following are the most important manifestations of this:

1 - The security crisis in Sinai and the incursion of terrorism.

The wrong military handling of the crisis by displacement and killing of the people of Sinai and the demolition of houses while terrorist groups expand at the expense of the state.

2 - The waste of national territory (Tiran and Sanafir model), the failure to demarcate the border with Greece, the fall of

agreements with Cyprus, and the signing of an agreement with Ethiopia related to filling the Renaissance Dam, thus wasting Egypt's historical right in the waters of the River Nile.

3. Dropping confidence in the institutions of the state and turn them into institutional tools that do not fulfill the functions for which they were established, whether in the defense of the land or the achievement of justice and security.

4 - Serious community division.

5. Cooperation and full coordination with the Zionist entity.

Fifth: International and regional failure:

This axis dealt with the coup regime's failures in Egyptian foreign policy and its regional and international relations.

Sixth: Failure in the management of the economic file:

The Axis tackled the following issues:

- Waste of Gulf aid.
- Increase of military spending.
- Waste of local resources.
- The army's involvement in the civilian economy.
- Projects not required for the time.
- Decline in social protection.
- Macroeconomic indicators.

Seventh: Failure to manage the file of public services and utilities:

The axis dealt with the failures and waste of public funds in the following sectors:

- Education sector
- Health sector
- Housing sector
- Drinking water and sanitation

Eighth: Failure in the management of labour file:

Despite the violence of the state in the face of the general protests, its violence against labor protests was more severe. The focus of the confrontation was 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. It also addressed the criticism of the International Labour Organization, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for violations of worker's rights in Egypt, Labor Unions law and talked about the danger of involving the judiciary in an attempt to liquidate trade union freedoms.

Ninth: Failure to manage the file of agriculture:

The book deals with examples of failure - just examples - through the following topics: (Nile water file - file of the Renaissance Dam - the file of wheat and carcinogenic shipments - file of rice cultivation - file of agricultural fertilizers).

Tenth: Failure in Arts, Drama, Cinema and Theater:

If the state of art and culture in any society is the mirror of its civilization and prosperity or its decline and collapse, the situation reached by the arts and culture in Egypt now reveal the extent of the deterioration experienced by Egypt and to any level of moral and social absurdity.

Eleventh: Failure in the media file:

It deals with the press, satellite channels and social media.

In conclusion, I in addition to nearly one hundred Egyptian parliamentarians, hope that this book, which is only a concentrated summary of extensive reports, will contribute to revealing of the facts to a great people whose will has been confiscated and its revolution aborted and its demands, for which it sacrificed, were circumvented. But there is no bread no freedom no social justice.

We also hope that the Black Book will contribute to the building of freedom, the destruction of the wall of dictatorship and the return of kidnapped Egypt to its loyal people.

Long live Egypt and long live Egyptian people defending its freedom, development and soil.



Constitutional and legal framework..

Continuous and catastrophic violations



Challenging the Legitimacy of the Military Constitution.

- Disabling the constitution which was the subject of a referendum in 2012.
- Appointment of all members of the 50th Committee to amend the Constitution of 2014 by the coup regime.
- The exclusion of opponents of the military coup deliberately.
- Lack of transparency in its formation.

First: Structural flaw:

- With the exception of the amendment of the articles on the identity of the state and the duties of society, the rest of the amended articles are intended to strengthen the foundations of the existing deep state apparatuses, the army, the police and the judiciary, and to strengthen their independence and immunity against any future elected body.
- Articles relating to rights and freedoms have not been established and protected by a democratic system where they have been restricted by the provisions of the laws issued to regulate them.

Second: Violation of the coup regime to their own constitution:

1. Sovereignty and public violations:

The military violated the Constitution in this aspect in more than 10 articles, most important of which are the following :

- Violation of the border demarcation agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia for article 1 and 139.
- Violation of priorities of utilization of projects related to housing, development and resettlement in Nubia and Sinai to Article 236.
- The hostility of the official discourse of the regime towards the revolution of January as mentioned in the preamble

of the Constitution as a unique revolution between the major revolutions in the history of humanity.

- Violation of combat missions in which troops were sent out of bounds to Article 152, which requires the prior approval of Parliament.

2. Violations of the economic and social aspect:

- The non-compliance of the regime with the criteria of transparency and governance, the lack of sources of funding for major projects, and the control of the institutions of the system over major projects and trying to monopolize economic sectors, contrary to Article 27.
- The sale and assignment to foreign investors of areas of the country, involves a violation of Article 32.
- Attempts by the regime to confiscate land with benefits from its owners, in violation of Article 40.
- The agreement with Ethiopia concerning the abandonment of the Nile River water, contrary to Article 44.

3. Violations of service aspects:

- Violation of all public budgets especially in the health sector, Article 18.
- Violation of large parts of the educational curricula of our children to the Article 19.

- Failure to declare a comprehensive plan to eliminate illiteracy, contrary to Article 25.

4. Violations of freedoms:

- Violation of proceedings against political parties and groups, interference of the executive authority in the work of the legislative and judicial authority, and numerous violations of human rights, to article 4.
- Violation of measures against women to Article 11.
- Violation of the trade union law to articles 13 and 76.
- Violation of the military trial of civilians to Article 15.
- Non-accountability of those responsible for crimes of torture in violation of articles 52, 55 and 60.
- Violation of arbitrary arrest of citizens and enforced disappearances to article 54.
- Violation of broadcasting recorded calls for opposition, Article 57.
- Violation of travel ban without a reasoned court order, Article 63.
- The displacement of the citizens of Rafah and El-Arish is contrary to Article 64.
- The violation of articles 65, 66 and 67 by the Authority, which guarantees freedom of opinion and thought.

- Prevent the publication of some articles, and the siege of media institutions, contrary to articles 71 and 72.
- Violation of more than 13 articles related to the House of Representative.
- Violation of five articles of the Constitution related to the judiciary.

Third: Legislation contrary to the Constitution:

The coup authority has enacted legislations that are considered the worst in the history of Egypt. The most prominent of these laws are:

- Protest law
- Anti-terrorism law is contrary to several articles, including: 95, 154 and others.
- The law of terrorist entities.



Legislation of the coup regime...

deliberate chaos



The period of appointed president Adly Mansour:

- Number of legislations for the term of the appointed Adly Mansour from July 03, 2013, until 07 June 2014, 28 legislations.

The most disastrous laws issued by Adly Mansour:

- A law that allows reconciliation in tax disputes and evasion to appease the segments of the businessmen , rewarding them for standing by the military coup.

- A Decree-law to amend some provisions of the Penal Code, so that whoever insulted the President of the Republic shall be punished with a fine of not less than 10 thousand pounds and not more than 30 thousand pounds.
- Protest law to prevent the right to public meetings, marches and peaceful demonstrations.
- Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure to extend the duration of preventive detention indefinitely.
- Law on immunity of the decisions of the Supreme Committee for the presidential elections and raising the ceiling of publicity budget to twenty million Egyptian pounds.

Period of General of the coup Abdul Fattah al-Sisi:

196 Decree-law were issued, including 106 laws related to linking the budgets of the administrative organs of the state, i.e. 90 laws were passed either new legislations or amendments to existing legislation.

The most important laws issued by the coup leader to tighten his grip over the people:

In 2014:

- Amend the Universities Law to change the system of

selection of university rectors and deans of colleges to appoint loyalists.

- Amend the income tax law to subject the net profit earned by the Egyptians abroad to tax.
- Amend the pension and insurance law of the armed forces with a new increase of pensions by 10%.
- Excessive punishment of receiving funds and aid from abroad to curb civil society organizations.
- Amendment of the law of Azhar University to fire professors for participation in protest.
- Issuance of Law on the Protection of Public property as a pretext to refer civilians to military trials.
- Making it permissible to extradite foreign suspects to their country in any of the stages of prosecution.

In 2015:

- Amending the law governing universities to determine the cases of dismissal of the teaching staff.
- Amending the child's law to reduce the child's age in the application of some penalties from 21 to 18 years.
- Organize lists of terrorist entities and terrorists.
- The new civil service law.

- Raising military pensions by 10% as of July 1, 2015.
- Identifying situations of dismissal of heads and members of the supervisory bodies, which was used to dismiss the head of the Central Auditing Agency.
- The law of the media bodies for the control of the executive authority over media organizations.
- The Law of Non-Governmental Organizations for the nationalization of civil work in Egypt.
- Law of security companies and money transfer with the exception of the police and the army.
- Law authorizing Suez Canal Authority to establish joint stock companies.



The destructive economic policies of the military and its social effects



Since July 2013, it has been observed that economic policies with their various components (monetary, financial, commercial, investment and employment) are driven by the mentality of the military into unprecedented collapses, leading to high prices at the expense of economic and social conditions.

- Liberalization of exchange rate, interest rate or decisions on rationalization of imports without any researches or participation of other sectors.

- The economic program that was signed with the International Monetary Fund in late 2016 despite its disasters and its implementation before being presented to parliament. The program raised the unemployment rate to more than 20% of the labor force. The poverty rate jumped to 30% of the population. The rate of inflation exceeded 32% according to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.
- The rise in public debt at unprecedented rates: \$ 81 billion for foreign debt and 3.16 trillion pounds for domestic loans at the end of June 2017.
- Interest on the public debt in the 2017/2018/ budget is expected to be about 400 billion pounds, which is equivalent to 33% of the public expenditure in the budget.
- Weekly loans rise to about LE 12 billion a week.

The disastrous economic policies of the coup regime and its social effects:

Financial Policy:

- In the absence of a program to reduce the value of public debt, the coup regime does not specify allocations that meet the needs of people in the fields of education, health and infrastructure.

- The tendency of the military to impose new taxes, notably value added tax, and the imposition of taxes on the stock exchange, leading to placing additional costs on producers, limiting their ability to compete in the domestic and global markets.
- The policy of increasing the tax burden during recession leads to more exit of investors, whether local or foreigners

Monetary policy:

- Floating the price of the pound in November 2016 all of a sudden without the participation of economic sectors led to large jumps in the value of the dollar against the pound exceeded 18 pounds to the dollar and resulted in high inflation rates and the spread of social problems.
- Increasing the burden of the cost of life on families and the continued raise of the prices of services and public goods by the military.
- The black market is still operating, because of the lack of foreign currency.
- Refusing to increase the interest rate in response to the IMF by the business community for its effects on higher production costs and increase the burden of government debt.

Trade policy:

- The coup regime attempted to reduce the import due to dollar deficit, which led to a decline in production rates due to the production dependence of about 75% on imports.
- The advantage that the military relied on to reduce the value of the Egyptian pound by achieving an increase in exports was not realized due to the dependence of industries on imported production inputs.

Investment Policy:

The coup governments tended to attract foreign investment but that did not happen for several reasons:

- Inability of Egypt to provide subsidized energy to investors.
 - Lack of skilled labor, even though it has cheap labor.
- 67% of foreign direct investment in Egypt is in the oil prospecting sector, which does not create job opportunities suitable for the Egyptian market.
- Domestic investment. Investors suffer from high inflation, the inability of buyers to buy in quantities that help to increase production, the inability to raise workers' wages and the rise in interest rates led to the curtailment of investment movement.

Employment Policy:

- Unemployment rises to 20%.
- Egyptian labor suffer from wage mismatch with rising prices.

Significant economic errors of the military coup in Egypt:

- The loss of Gulf aid, which reached about 40 to 60 billion dollars over the period from July 2013 to date without knowing the aspects of spending.
- Increase military expenditure by buying weapons and military equipment from European countries and Russia, while the economy is in urgent need for subsidy.
- The waste of local resources in imaginary projects such as expansion of the Suez Canal at a cost of about 8 billion dollars, collected from citizens without any returns.
- The army's involvement in the civil economy and its acquisition of most public projects.
- The decline in social care increased poverty and the unemployment and the spread of many negative social phenomena such as illegal immigration.



EGYPT

The coup and national security



The coup d'etat tried to address the people at the outset of the coup describing what happened as an attempt to restore the kidnapped state and maintain national security. Then large number of people discovered that the power gang is the one that kidnapped the state, weakened the nation and undermined national security.

We have here 4 models of the bitter harvest for more than 4 years under this authority.

First: **Sinai, under siege:**

Observers agree that the power of the coup regime is insufficient to fulfill its functions. The oppressive state lacks the ability to carry out its security duties and instead resorted to violence against its citizens to compensate for its security shortcomings. This is reflected in its approach to dealing with the Sinai situation in three pillars:

1. Displacement of the people of Sinai:

By the end of October 2014, the governorate of North Sinai decided to begin the process of evacuating the border area in the Egyptian city of Rafah as part of what it considered as the efforts of the state to eliminate the cross-border terrorist outposts and set a distance of 300 meters to form a buffer. Giving the citizens one week to move to another place without providing them with alternative housing. The Egyptian authorities did not hesitate to expand the buffer zone from 300 meters to 1,500 meters.

According to the Egyptian Observatory for Rights and Freedom, the number of displaced families reached 3,856, and the number of displaced citizens was 26,992, including the elderly, children and women. The area covered by the displacement policy was more than 20 square kilometers (1.5 km x 13.5 km).

2. The Plight of Copts:

The absence of the state has had an impact on the security of Coptic citizens. ISIS has targeted them repeatedly since the beginning of 2017. The month of February alone saw seven Copts being liquidated. In the wake of this hardship, 40 Copts were displaced according to BBC.

3. Excessive force against the people of Sinai:

Despite the strenuous efforts of the people of Sinai to help eliminate the terrorist practices in Sinai, and despite the price they pay for it, the image of the citizens of Sinai continue to be distorted which represents a cover for the use of excessive violence against them.

The report prepared by the Egyptian Observatory for Rights and Freedom, which covers only the period from 3 July 2013 to the end of May 2015, including more than 8 months to enforce the state of emergency in North Sinai, reported that the confrontations of the various security services with the civilians of Sinai resulted in 1347 extrajudicial killings, 11906 cases of arbitrary detention, 9073 cases of arrest, 2833 cases of detention on suspicion, 2577 cases of house demolitions, 1853 cases of burning of

Bedouins' cottages in Sinai, and 1967 cases of destruction and burning of movables of citizens.

Second: Wasting of national territory and wealth

The coup regime used the concept of border demarcation in a way that contradicted the national interest and wasted the sovereignty of the state over its territory and the guarantee of national security, as well as the wealth of citizens.

a. Tiran and Sanafir:

On April 8, 2016, the Egyptian and Saudi governments signed an agreement to demarcate their maritime borders, under which Egypt relinquished the islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia.

The Strait of Tiran is geographically the only port on the Gulf of Aqaba because it is the only navigable corridor. Egypt's control of this strait has preserved its national security and secured commercial and military tracks serving Egypt, thus enhancing its national security.

B. Compromising the border with Greece:

While Egypt is doing beyond its national interest in order to have warm relations with the Zionist entity, the Zionist entity has made strenuous efforts, including pressure on

Egypt to accept the demarcation of the border with Greece, to ensure the concession of Egypt to the water strip to Greece. Enabling the passage of the gas pipeline connecting Tel Aviv and Athens without passing through the Egyptian territory, hence without the Zionist entity being forced to pay any fees to Egypt.

Greece has succeeded in exploiting the Egyptian hatred of Turkey to persuade Egypt to include the island of CasteloZero near Turkey as the basis for demarcating its border with it, which means depriving Turkey of any territorial or economic water in this region. However, Egypt's acceptance of this demand made Egypt give Greece a maritime strip twice the length of the Egyptian delta, which means more losses to Egypt and its wealth.

C. The pitfall of the new agreements with Cyprus:

The loss of Egyptian wealth at the «Kalamata» tripartite summit between Egypt, Cyprus and Greece is a more complicated story. In 2010, scientific reports, confirmed the existence of the largest gas discovery in the Mediterranean in the middle of the distance between Egypt and Cyprus, set by an agreement signed by the countries in 2003

before the emergence of serious geological surveys carried out by the Euro-Mediterranean countries as well as the Zionist entity. Following this discovery, Cyprus, without consultation with Egypt in accordance with the terms of their border demarcation agreement, signed the agreement on the demarcation of the border with the Zionist entity in December 2010. Both countries (Cyprus, the Zionist entity) have announced their discovery of the gas fields. The value of the wealth of the two fields worth at least 200 billion dollars, which rushed the Zionist entity to allocate 620 million dollars to secure this field.

Third: **Weakening the State :**

A. The Military:

In our presentation of the situation in the Sinai region, we found that the military, which is supposed to secure the border, was unable to perform its security function. It resorted to confronting the Egyptian citizens, displacing them from their homes and entrusting the Palestinian and Israeli security services to secure the other side. This happens while the army is busy distributing food, and its soldiers are moving to work in fish farms.

B. The Judiciary:

Its verdicts have become the subject of harsh comments by international organizations in view of its politicized rulings that curb the freedoms of all those who wish to speak the word of justice about the causes of their country such as journalists, trade unionists and politicians. When a segment of the judges sensed danger and tried out of harmony of the executive branch, the latter drafted a law allowing it to tighten its grip on appointing the heads of judiciary.

C. The House of Representatives:

Formed by the military and its security services. We saw how the House passed more than 300 legislations issued in its absence in a period not exceeding 15 days.

D. Borrowing Machine:

The coup regime did not deal with the dollar crisis by increasing productivity and developing the state's dollar resources. Instead, it handled it through the transforming of the Ministries of Finance and International Cooperation, in addition to the Central Bank of Egypt and even the banks into borrowing machines that raised the national dollar debt to reach 81 billion dollar. This policy is still being stimulated by the rise in external debt to more than one-third of GDP.

E. Policing: It is one of the factors that led to the decline in the function of the organs of the state, and away from the approach to dealing with the opposition, the phenomenon of torture of citizens has intensified. The tendency of the police to the killing of civilians and the failure of a wide range of police officers to perform their functions. The Ministry of Interior has followed the traces of the military to open outlets for the sale of food commodities.

Fourthly: **The split of the society:**

It can be said that the military succeeded in dividing the national unity according to the criterion of « Who is not with me is against me» where the opponent of the regime is opponent of the state regardless of his intellectual discourse.

This approach led to the situation of everyone in the face of everyone. The coup leader is unable to face any external challenge with bribing international parties or affiliation to the Gulf coup sponsor states. Also he he couldn't face any internal challenge without using a security stick.

The Copts of Egypt cannot be excluded from this general picture, turning it into a «frightened minority» forced by the vicissitudes of government to join a collective power that cannot protect them and plunge the country into an endless cycle of violence.

Deterioration of political life in Egypt after the coup of July 3, 2013



Since the January 2011 revolution, the Egyptian political scene has witnessed successive developments. It has undergone a period of unprecedented political openness and freedom, which was accompanied by chaos. Then came the military coup on July 3, 2013. Egypt has undergone a new phase since that date, more violent and radical in corrupting the political life than the era of the authoritarianism that

Egypt experienced before the January revolution.

Features and characteristics of political life in Egypt after the July 3 coup:

1 - The oppressive climate and the collapse of political participation:

The issues of alleged counter-terrorism, stabilization and maintaining national security for the political scene took place after the coup d'état of July 3, 2013. The public opinion was inspired by the fact that addressing these issues was the way to escape the state of chaos that resulted from the revolution. A segment of Egyptians from the very first moment refused that and decided to oppose this coup and to confront it popularly, encouraging the public and broad segments of society, despite all restrictions, to publicly oppose such a situation.

In light of the severe repression, arrests, killings and the liquidation of anti-coup demonstrations, these protests have receded, and this may be understood under an official address that views any opposition activity as «very few people want to overthrow the regime and destabilize the homeland» and that «Egypt faces several internal and external challenges, where there is no opportunity for such practices and there is no time for democracy!!

And the policy of the coup regime to harass its opponents, by promoting the link of any movement on the ground with the scenario of «chaos» and the disputes among the elite, who are considered in favor of revolution, and the exchange of accusations between them, shaking the confidence of the citizen in these elite, and made them in his view, «irresponsible» and unable to manage the scene.

On the other hand, the media and the repression apparatus have distorted the image of the opposition movements and youth activists. In addition to building of a wall isolating the groups of society from the Muslim Brotherhood. Although most of arguments of the system began to fall, and they were promoted until recently recognized that it is no longer useful and became unconvincing . However this succeeded in reducing the capacity of the opposition forces to mobilize and negatively affected the credibility of their speech in the face of the regime.

2 - Absence of political and youth power:

The regime was the only winner of the war of attrition between the various forces and political currents, as it tightened its grip on the security and media. As for the people themselves, it is the on-again off-again in the political equation. It is hostage to the

process of intimidation and fragmentation among the political forces on the one hand and the tightening of the criminal iron fist on the pretext of protecting the state and its sovereignty and defending national security on the other. Eventually prompted the majority of citizens to prefer to move away and return to isolation from the political scene as a whole.

This scene is very clear when the anniversary of the January 25th revolution is celebrated in the past two years. All youth movements and political parties are absent and all refuse to take part in any activities to commemorate the anniversary, as a result of arrests and intimidation.

3 - The hegemony of the army on the state and society and the monopoly of politics and economy:

It is clear from day one that Sisi, by nature and composition, is committed to remain within his main pillars of power, represented by the armed forces. Therefore, the link between failure and security repression with the increasing role of the army and its monopoly on the supreme policy in Egypt is what creates a kind of panic when remembering the possibility of a clash with it.

Moreover, the distortion of the army image and the clash with it are unpopular issues at the grassroots level that sanctifies

the army even if it creates tyrants.

One of the indicators of this control is the study of the «Military Company» of the Carnegie Endowment, a study that monitored the horrific aspects of Egypt's international military partnerships and mentioned that the army's involvement in the economy is purely profitable and utilitarian. It is preceded by a study called «The Officers' Republic», which refers to the dominant competitive aspect of the army on the economy and how catastrophic it is.

4 - The return of authoritarian elections and the end of the democratic vote

The parliamentary elections were held in 2012 based on the relative list system, which is an electoral system that combines closed party lists and the individual system by two thirds for the first and one third for the second. The Constitutional Court dissolved the parliament to reject this formula, reflecting the state's deep attempt to eliminate the elected institutions. Although this electoral system gave a great boost to party political work.

The Muslim Brotherhood continued to be able to compete and win the relative majority amidst a strong presence of the Nur Party (Salafi) in addition to secular, liberal and leftist parties.

Thus, the task of changing this situation and returning to the individual electoral system was one of the most important tasks of those responsible for corrupting political life in Egypt again. At the level of the presidential election law, the coup-appointed interim President Adly Mansour issued a law to organize the presidential elections, immunizing the rulings of the Supreme Elections Committee from any challenge.

The election law, enacted in 2014, stipulates that the parliament consists of 600 elected deputies divided into 480 seats in the individual system and 120 seats from closed lists by 80% to 20%, and independents and parties are eligible to run for both. The constituencies are divided by a system of sectors, which includes more than one province of the same constituency and wins the list of the highest votes in all seats of the constituency and exclude the rest of the lists without any representation. Which made this system unsuitable for small parties that do not have broad institutional and social rules.

5 - Decorative party life:

The military allied with the civil political forces to overthrow the elected President together with the large role of the parties in the first post-coup period in 2013. With the growing ambition of these forces to play a major political role

after the absence of the Islamic trend of political competition, to give a role to the political parties in the government of Hazem Beblawi to satisfy the civil political forces and to support their position in support of the military coup against the elected civilian rule. In addition to seeking to beautify the turbulent political scene at the international level. A period that did not last long, because of the adoption of a system of policies that marginalizes and weakens the parties. The beginning of the adoption of the approved individual seats on the electoral system, which reduces the chances of parties to win seats, as well as strong security penetration of the parties in order to fragment and divide them to achieve what is in the interest of the ruling regime.

The presidential elections in 2014, which saw a very low turnout, caused a scandal for the Sisi regime and has created a justification for the Sisi to implicitly declare his indifference to political parties, as he was days before the election had called on parties to play a positive role to motivate the masses to participate in the elections, which had not happened giving Sisi a pretext to force them to submit to him in full and not to claim any share of power.

6 - Weakening civil society:

For many years, the Egyptian society enjoyed areas of freedom in its civil and social space. The power of the government was limited in the life of the citizen. The Egyptians gained many of their institutions and activities through their civil efforts until the military came to power.

In the light of January 25 revolution, the Civil Society Law was reformulated several times to impose greater freedom, while the state's deep institutions dealt with «severe hostility» with civil society organizations, particularly human rights organizations that were the cause of revealing numerous human rights violations and internationally escalating them.

At the end of 2011, the government prepared the famous case of «foreign funding for NGOS». However, the presence of Dr. Morsi in power, with the continued strength of the revolution, prevented the deep state from achieving its will.

After the coup d'état, and under the coalition that existed between the civil-secular forces and the military, the military regime responded to some of the desires of the civil forces, especially concerning the freedom of social and civil work, before these settlements were circumvented and closed completely later.

The new law of the NGOs of the military included a waiver of the constitutional provision that requires the establishment of the organization by notification, giving the right to the government to object to the establishment and cancellation of the organization.

A new executive committee has also been established, which includes, for the first time, representatives of the General Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Interior and other ministries to take over the responsibility of approving any external funding directed to Egyptian NGOs as well as the control of foreign NGOs authorized to operate inside Egypt. As well as to monitor their activities accurately and give the administrative authorities the right to enter the headquarters of the NGO and control over its records and activities.

These practices reflect the regime's rejection of civil action. The NGOs' documentation of the unprecedented abuses of power against these bodies, such as arrest, travel ban and freezing of funds of human rights organizations, has been recognized by the regime. The voice of NGOs and some professional associations should also be silenced so as «No voice is louder than the voice of the Regime».



International and regional failure of the coup regime



The coup d'état of July 3, 2013, has reduced the capabilities of the Egyptian state on all levels, and has undermined its status abroad and made it part of many recently established international and regional states in order to consolidate its power and seek external legitimacy.

The features of the failure of the coup at the regional level:

File of Renaissance Dam:

- The signature of the Head of Authority on the Declaration of Principles of the Renaissance Dam on March 23, 2015.
- This has resulted in the loss of Egypt's right to its share and the cancellation of previous international agreements.
- Violation of the Constitution, which requires the consent of the people to any agreements relating to sovereignty.
- Loss of the Sudanese side in that battle and stand on the Ethiopian side because of the practices of the coup regime.
- Egypt loss of opportunities in international arbitration as a result of signing the agreement.

Regional Security Profile:

- The failure of the ousted General Khalifa Haftar in Libya to secure the western border of Egypt.
- The indiscriminate bombing of towns inside Libya and the killing of dozens of civilians, women and children described by Amnesty International as a «war crime.»
- Despite the super relations of the coup regime with the Zionist entity, which led to anger in large sectors of Egyptian people, it did not stabilize situation in Sinai.
- The criminal policies of the coup in Sinai such as the displacement of people and destruction of houses creating an fertile environment for the incubators of the militants and a favorable climate and attractive to jihadist ideology across the region.

Deterioration of relations with Sudan:

- Hosting the Sudanese opposition to pressure the regime in Khartoum, allowing them to ruin the image of Sudan.
- Dealing with Sudan at the official and media level with inferiority.
- Support the Government of South Sudan militarily.
- Support the rebels in Darfur.
- Dealing with the ruling party in Sudan as an Islamic party, such as dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood.

This led to Sudan's response with a tone of hostility as follows:

- Stand by Ethiopia in the file of Renaissance Dam.
- Escalation of the conflict on the Halaib and Shalatin disputed towns.
- Making the entry of Egyptians to Sudan on a visa.
- The threat of canceling the four freedoms agreement with Egypt.
- Withdrawal of the Sudanese Ambassador from Egypt.

Change of the situation towards the Syrian revolution:

Fluctuation in the position of the coup regime from the Syrian crisis. The basic compass in that policy was the need for external funding and therefore the support of Bashar the killer was not explicitly expressed for fear of Saudi anger.

However it took several measures against the revolution:

- Harassment of Syrian opposition and refugees in Egypt to push them out of the country, claiming their threat to national security and that they support the regime of President Morsi.
- Refusal to invite the Syrian National Coalition to attend the Arab Summit and to receive an official Syrian delegation of Bashar in December 2014.
- Vote in favor of the pro-Russian Security Council in support of Bashar.
- Supporting Bashar's position in fighting the opposition in the name of «terrorism and the Muslim Brotherhood».
- Allow some Egyptian popular delegations to visit Bashar regime in Syria.
- Dealing with Bashar regime as an existing system and solving the Syrian crisis within the framework of a political solution within the Russian vision.

The relationship with Saudi Arabia fluctuated:

After the military coup, Egypt became part of the Saudi regime for financial aid.

- The coup official media attack against Saudi Arabia when the funding stopped.
- Demanding Saudi Arabia to foot the debt bills of the coup.
- The military regime's forcible abandonment of two of the

most important strategic islands in the Red Sea, the islands of Tiran and Sanafir.

- The coup regime's acted as if it does not have the right to defend its land and does not resort to international arbitration, but was a supporter of a foreign state and opponent of the national forces, and defied decisions of the judiciary.

Abandonment of maritime borders in the eastern Mediterranean:

- Holding suspicious deals with both the Zionist entity and Cyprus for demarcation of maritime borders and Egyptian economic waters.
- Entering an alliance with the Zionist entity, Greece and Cyprus against the Turkey, which increased tension with them.

An attempt to end the Palestinian cause by “the Deal of the Century”.

The Egyptian Military regime has worked to abort the Palestinian cause and settle it within the framework of the so-called «Deal of the Century» through:

- Draining the sources of resistance and imposing siege on Gaza over the years of the coup.
- Cooperation with the Zionist entity to prevent the entry of shipments of food and medicine to the Gaza Strip and the continuation of the siege in order to force the resistance to surrender.

- Giving the upper hand to the Zionist entity in drawing the lines of the Deal of the Century in cooperation with the Trump administration.
- Pressure by the coup regime in order on Hamas to accept Deal of the Century to lift the siege and the opening of the Rafah crossing.

Features of failure at the international level:

After the military coup, the Egyptian state has become a burden on the international community and eventually belongs to those who support it because of:

- The continued and growing need for financial and economic aid.
- Deferred payment of the commercial and military deals.
- Fear of the collapse of the state and its transformation into a failed state.
- Fear of Egypt becoming a source of refugees, illegal immigration, organized crime, terrorism and other security concerns.

In this sense, countries are dealing with the coup regime in Egypt:

- As a gatekeeper for refugees.
- as a fighter for terrorism.
- and a market for its weapons and military industries.

Summary and documentation of Human Rights violations in Egypt

From July 2013 through March 2018



July 3rd 2013 is the date in which human rights situation in Egypt has changed, it is not an exaggeration to say that it is the date of collapse of human rights and aggression of freedom and non-respect of law.

Violation of the right to life:

Over more than four years there have been 3744 case of extrajudicial killing, including direct physical liquidation and

medical negligence inside prisons. Total of implemented death sentences 29, total of pending death sentences 30.

Summary Execution:

Arbitrary execution is the result of a verdict issued by a court which did not respect the standards of fair trials and it is a case of arbitrary killing. Especially those guarantees mentioned in the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the right of the human being not to be deprived of life arbitrarily as an inherent right regardless of his color, ethnicity or gender. Egyptian judiciary went far in issuing mass death sentences lacking fair trials according to unofficial reports and statistics published by many human rights institutions.

Violations against women:

Woman, same as man, in Egypt was not spared from the brutality of the coup regime. She was exposed to many violations, in violation of the law and constitution and all international conventions which Egypt ratified, and they are binding by the power of law regarding the rights of the woman in specific. End of year 2013 according to a report issued by Thompson Reuters Egypt was ranked the worst Arab country in which women live. According to the report 99.3% of women and girls in Egypt were sexually harassed, 27.2 .

million women and girls about 91 % of Egyptian females were circumcised. 63 % are illiterate. Then the issue developed by the regime daring to arrest and detain women at different ages. Girls under 13 years old were arrested and had prison sentences. Others between 18 and 40 years old still inside prisons, they were arrested on demonstration cases or political cases with false and malicious charges. Women in Egypt were not an exception from killing, torture and enforced disappearance same as men.

Violations against children:

According to unofficial sources, number of violations against children reached 3108000 children over the past four years.

In a report issued by Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms, it is was mentioned that the number of detained children in Egypt from July 2013 through end of 2016 reached 4000 of which 800 still in detention.

In a report issued by UN Team of Arbitrary Detention in July 2015, the children arrested since events of June 2013 through end of May 2015 reached 3002 most of which were tortured and severely beaten inside detention.

Violations in Egyptian prisons:

During that period according to unofficial statistics the number of prisoners reached 60000.

The number of prisons in Egypt till January 2011 was 43 prisons and 382 police stations custody. During the period 2011 through June 15th 2013 2 prisons were built, and over more than four years from July 2013 through July 2017 decrees were issued of building new prisons reaching 21 new prisons. This brings the number of prisons to 66 at a time when Egypt is suffering from housing crisis and economic and social problems.

Most important violations inside prisons:

1-Malnutrition

Negligence of nutritional system always leads to spread of diseases, where the normal food program presented to prisoners is the worst ever, because it contains specific types of meals given regularly without including the nutritional elements significant to human body. The way of cooking is very bad for it is done in an unclean environment, and non-conformingly prepared. Moreover, receiving food during family visits is totally prohibited for prisoners.

2- Crowding in prisons:

Average prison cell space ranging from 4 to 6 square meters. Average number of prisoners in one cell is 40. This resulted in receiving complaints of prisoners inability to sleep inside cells for they sleep in shifts. No doubt that this large number of prisoners inside this narrow space leads to spread of epidemic and respiratory diseases.

One cell mainly has one 1m X 50cm small ventilation window which does not allow sun and air in. Water is available only for one hour every three days, hence they use unclean subterranean water which affects kidney and leads to spread of epidemic diseases. Also prisoners cannot take a bath for long periods. Cells are not regularly cleaned up, garbage is not collected for long time unless officers check out cells.

Blankets and appropriate furniture are not available and prisoners sleep on the floor which affects health conditions especially the elderly. There are some prisoners banned from exercise for long periods of time which badly affects their bones and psychological condition.

3- Poor medical and health care of prisoners:

Medical services inside prisons are very poor. It is a

tool of the regime to slowly kill the prisoners and abuse them through deliberate refraining from presenting medical services to prisoners.

Tuberculosis, diabetes, heart, chest allergy, fever, rheumatism and skin cancer are common diseases in prisons. According to a report of Egyptian Monitor for Human Rights and Freedoms (NGO) the number of imprisoned cancer patients in Egypt since July 2013 reached 790, in all Egyptian prisons, where prison hospitals do not have the necessary potentials nor the technical preparations. Appropriate treatment is not available or suitable for the medical case. Most of the medication are useless analgesics and are being given to all patients with different illnesses. In most cases patients go to the hospital and get no benefit, no patient care. There are some cases checked and diagnosed and were prescribed medications contrary to their illness. In addition to cases of death inside prison due to medical negligence which reached according to unofficial statistics 543 cases in four years.

Police stations and prisons witnessed death cases due to deliberate abstention of presenting medical and health services to prisoners and detainees, that makes them crimes of killing

rather than natural death. They set the minimum model rules for treating prisoners, recommended by UN and approved by the economic and social council under the title of medical services. Every prison must have a specialist doctor for each medical and psychological specialty along with availability of medications, in addition to protective and environmental safety and right nutrition.

National Human Rights Council issued a report on May, 2015 in which it said that crowding in police station custody reached 400% and in prisons reached 160%. The report demanded solution to the crisis of crowding inside prisons, and all death cases were due to poor health and living conditions inside detention facilities and prisons.

4- Prohibition of visits or intransigence during visits:

Visit is a right for the prisoner and his family according to law, laws and statutes of prisons state «Every convict has the right to keep up a correspondence and to be visited by his relatives according to the prison regulations». Person in preventive custody also have this right, without prejudice to what the law of criminal procedures requires concerning them in this regard.

Nevertheless, prison authorities made it a suffering not a visit, the prisoner and his family live this suffering prohibition and intransigence, according to the stories of several prisoners relatives on the level of Egyptian prisoners, all prisons authorities control visits if they want to stop or allow them despite having general prosecution permit, amid the intransigence and harassment of prisoners and their families.

Freedom of Expression:

For more than four years Egyptian Press and journalists are in danger, the journalist in Egypt is either killed, injured or a prisoner. According to Reporters without Borders report on international freedom of press, Egypt has retreated to the rank 161 after being ranked 159 on 2016, while it was 127 six years ago. Egypt has completely lost the free atmosphere of free press during the past four years since events of July rd 2013. 793 journalists and media persons have been exposed to several violations by Egyptian security bodies. Egyptian authorities closed down 10 satellite channels in addition to closing and attacking of 12 bureaux of media institutions and arbitrarily sacking of 30 journalists, militarily trial for 6 journalists, 100 journalists in Egyptian regime prisons, and finally 9 journalists killed.

Peaceful Assembly:

Since July 2013 many violations have been committed to the rights of peaceful protesters, the authorities have dispersed crowds by force using live bullets and shot cartridges without any abidance by legal rules of dispersing protesters. Army and police aggression was monitored during Republican Guards events, Podium events, Rabaa and Nahda massacres, Ramsis 1&2 events, Fath Mosque events and Police Transport Car. Authorities targeted all peaceful protests with live bullets, shot cartridges, tear gas bombs and other oppression tools, they have killed dozens and arrested thousands.

Enforced disappearance:

According to unofficial statistics, the past four years have witnessed 5500 cases of enforced disappearance in Egypt by Police and security bodies. The crime start with kidnapping citizens from street or by arbitrary detention without warrant from homes. At this moment the kidnapped loses contact with his relatives and lawyer. According to reports from families of victims, they are brutally tortured till death or threatened to be killed and raped to force them to confess committing crimes they did not commit. During the first half of 2017,

1500 enforced disappearance cases were recorded.

Referral of civilians to military tribunals:

In Egypt military tribunals are exceptional courts run by the military to investigate and issue verdicts on crimes referred to then by general prosecution.

Since July 3rd 2013 the Egyptian regime has tried to expand in trying civilians before military judiciary. But this situation was legalized by issuing the decree-law no. 136 of 2014, concerning protection of vital and public installations, and affiliation of their crimes to military

judiciary, instead of emergency law. The number of civilians referred to military trials is more than 10 thousand, with hundreds of prison and death sentences issued against them.

It is inconceivable that a state with a unified law and constitution is having two different judiciaries, civil judiciary with broad jurisdiction but does not apply on the military and military judiciary that can sentence the civilians and the military!!

Although the military judiciary is independent judiciary, the final provision of article (1) of military judiciary law say: The military jurisdiction is dependent on the Ministry of Defence.

Eventually law stipulated that an administrative body affiliated to Ministry of Defence be established with the mission of organizing and managing military judiciary, which clearly detracts the independence of the military judiciary. Moreover, it is contradictory to the Egyptian Constitution.

Holding Court sessions in premises affiliated to Ministry of Interior:

Since July 2013 till now, trial sessions have been held outside court, either at Police Academy or at Police Secretaries Institute at Tora, South Cairo. These are premises affiliated to Egyptian Ministry of Interior, which is contradictory to the principle of independence of judiciary in addition to banning of lawyers and families of defendants from attending session except with permission.

Decisions and laws restricting freedoms and contributing to repression:

Many laws and decisions restricting freedoms and contradictory to Egyptian constitution were issued during the past four years against the principles and criteria of human rights. 1200 decrees and laws have been adopted by the Presidency, Cabinet, Interior Minister and Justice Minister and

published on the official gazette since July 2013. Among the most important decrees and laws issued and greatly affected public freedoms and human rights in Egypt are the following:

- 1- Constitutional Declaration issued by General Command of Armed Forces on July 6th 2013.
- 2- Constitutional Declaration issued by interim president Adly Mansour on July 8th 2013.
- 3- Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code, which considered preventive detention as a punishment not a precautionary measure. Law no. 83 of 2013.
- 4- Law on Demonstration no. 107 of 2013.
- 5- Decrees to transform places of detention into prisons including Interior Ministry, decree no. 2028 of 2013.
- 6- Premises affiliated to Interior Ministry set to hold sessions either to renew detention or trials. For instance, Justice Minister decree no. 5790 of 2013 and 5025 of 2014.
- 7- Approved amendments to military judiciary law of which the Republican Decree no. 12 of 2014.
- 8- Renewal of the state of emergency in Egypt. law no. 12 of 2017 on amending some articles of the law no. 162 of 1958.
- 9- Declaration of state of emergency in North Sinai and continuously renewing it. Law no. 487 of 2016.

- 10- Law on security and protection of public property no. 136 of 2014.
- 11- Special amendments to the Prison Regulations, Interior Minister decree no. 344 of 2017.
- 12- Amendment of some of the universities' law, Minister of Education decree no. 4915 of 2014 concerning students' statute.
- 13- Civil service law on career inside state apparatus, law no. 81 of 2016 and its executive regulations issued by decree 1216 of 2017.
- 14- Law on NGOS no. 70 of 2017.
- 15- Law on terrorist entities no. 8 of 2015.

Cultural, Social and Economic Rights:

Cultural, social and economic rights are not less important than other rights and must be highlighted, in addition to monitoring how these rights are respected in Egypt by the authorities and working on stopping all violations that contradict the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The preamble mentioned that «Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the idea of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created

whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights.»

Third: Independence of judges, lawyers and human rights advocates:

Sitting judiciary and standing judiciary, this is how the judges and lawyers are described in Egypt, in addition to human rights activists and NGOS are all the rubric of justice and right.

Their independence is a real guarantee for protection of human rights, however the Egyptian regime had practices that constitute blatant violation of the independence of judges and lawyers, and aggression on the freedoms and rights of human rights advocates and NGOS.

Violations against judges:

Egyptian authorities violated the freedom of lawyers and human rights advocates either by arrest and arbitrary detention or including them in cases with fabricated charges and issuing prisons sentences against them in addition to banning them from traveling. From July 2013 through end of 2015 217 aggressions on freedom of lawyers were monitored. The systematic aggression continued in 2016.

- Ban on travel of 17 human rights advocates illegally.

- Seizure of liquid and movable and immovable property of human rights advocates.
- 44 judges dismissed and benched

Violations against President Dr. Mohamed Morsi:

Violations of basic rights of President Mohamed Morsi were monitored as follows:

- First: **Violation of International Law:**

- A- Contravention of articles no. 1,2,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,21,30 of the International Declaration of Human Rights.
- B- Contravention of articles no. 5,7,9,10,14,26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Second: **Constitutional and Legal Violations:**

- Suspension of provisions of constitution and laws, and banning state installations and general authorities from practicing their jobs and change of regime by force, Which is punishable by Egyptian Penal Code article 86, 87 and 92.
- The President and his presidential team were arrested, enforceably disappeared and banned from contacting their families and lawyers.
- Contravention of general prosecution of Egyptian constitution and law by decisions of referral of president to criminal trial.
- Trial of the president before criminal court that has no jurisdiction according to the Egyptian constitution and law.

- During public court sessions, the president is put inside sound proof cage preventing him from following what happens in the sessions and defending himself if necessary, in contravention of Egyptian Criminal Procedure Code.
- Losing of all guarantees and international standards of fair trials in cases labelled as (political).
- Banning of visits to the president by his family and lawyers for more than four years.
- Exposing his life to danger by deliberate medical negligence and poor health care. where he declared in two court sessions that he is exposed to poor health care, malnutrition and he is afraid his life would be in danger. That was during his court session in May of 2017, and in June of 2017, where he said he had two diabetic comas and was not treated. He also refrained from eating except canned food, according to his son's statement.



The deterioration of the artistic reality in Egypt



The Theater crisis:

The theater suffers a near-death situation in 2017 under the military authority some of the manifestations as follows:

- State Theater: 25 performances only.
- Private theater: 0 performances
- Groups and theatrical houses: Less than 10 performances without audience.

This is due to the following:

- The Cairo International Theater Festival and the National Theater Festival stopped two years ago.

- Corruption and mis-management of the military leaders responsible for the state theater.
- Abolishing the principle of the independence of theatrical houses and theater groups after the cultural production sector in the Ministry of Culture is able to control them.
- Stoppage of the budget that was dedicated to theater festivals.
- The decision of the Minister of Culture with the participation of members of local councils and political parties in the boards of trustees of cultural institutions.

The influence of Egyptian drama has declined despite the large number of production.

The competitiveness of the Egyptian drama (serials) declined before the Syrian and Turkish production after it was the pioneer.

The Egyptian drama had a great opportunity to get its role back for the following reasons:

- The collapse of cinema and the escape of artists and directors of television production.
- The military intervenes with huge budgets to produce expensive work to polish its image.

However, this did not lead to its leadership because:

- Decline in business, mission and value.
- Strong control over all work and lack of freedom.

- Military enforcement of a specific agenda.
- Suspension of some work after production without compensating the producers.

The deterioration of film Industry under the coup:

Cinema is a collaborative art, employing hundreds of people in every work, and the film industry relies on more than 75 trades and professions.

Over the course of more than 100 years, Egyptian cinema has witnessed periods of prosperity, the most prosperous was in the era of monarchy, where freedom of art was protected . In 1946, Egypt produced 67 movies, while most of them were in decline in number and influence during times of military control and tyranny, thus killing freedom and creativity.

Features of the film industry crisis:

- The number of films produced each year (35 films) has averaged 50:65 over the past ten decades, while the production of some other countries annually: Turkey: 50, Iran: 250, Nigeria: 800, America: 1000, India, 1200.
- Declining revenues due to lack viewers turnout.
- Lack of support for young people and independent films, where they face regulatory and security constraints.

- Difficulties of logistics and filming procedures in public and important places.

Excessive wages:

- High prices and the collapse of the currency against the dollar in light of that most of the inputs of the industry are imported.
- The vertical and horizontal economic monopoly of industry.

Quality and craft crisis:

- The lack of good films is obvious that the Cairo International Film Festival 2017 did not include any Egyptian film.
- Few global prizes and competitive films.
- The weakness of technology and the absence of modern technical cadres.

Content Crisis:

- Restriction of political and intellectual freedom, increasing regulatory restrictions and directing producers to provide works that serve the agenda of the security system.
- The prevalence of moral and social absurdity.
- Reduced and limited titles and scenarios due to the state of alienation experienced by creative filmmakers.
- Cultural ambiguity in addition to cultural and literary disconnection to the entity.

Agriculture between Morsi and the coup

revealing figures



First: Wheat between self-sufficiency and import of carcinogenic shipments

Wheat in the era of Morsi:

- Dr. Mohamed Morsi pledged self-sufficiency of wheat within four years.

- The area under cultivation increased by 10% and productivity increased by 30%.
- The import of wheat was completely halted from the beginning of February until the military coup on 3 July 2013.
- The import bill under his reign has not exceeded seven million tons.
- President Morsi observed among wheat farmers the harvest day in the wheat fields in Alexandria.

Wheat during the coup:

- The areas planted with wheat in 2016 decreased by 500 thousand acres from the previous year by 16%.
- In 2017 fell 269 thousand acres from the previous year by 11%.
- Imports of wheat in the first year of the military coup increased from 8.4 million tons under Dr. Mohamed Morsi to 10.15 million tons at the end of 2013 and increased to 11.3 million tons in 2014 and to 11.9 million tons in 2015.
- Import of vaccines contaminated with carcinogenic ergot, poppy seeds, and other vaccines with low protein content.
- The coup government issued the 2017 / 2018 budget completely free of any subsidy for the wheat crop.

Second: Rice crop is about to extinct with the coup
Rice in the era of Morsi

- The rice cultivated area reached more than 2 million acres in 2012.
- Egypt rice harvest reached 10 million tons while white rice production reached more than 6 million tons.
- President Morsi ordered the rise of the ton price from 1450 pounds to 2050 pounds.
- He dropped the fines imposed on farmers during the era of the military council and before.
- The Ministry of Supply bought 800,000 tons of rice from farmers to build strategic stocks.
- Prices of rice in the ration system remained only one and a half pounds per kilo. Every citizen has 2 kilos of rice a month of the best types.

Rice in the era of the coup:

- Sisi brought pressure on rice growers and decreased the rice cultivated area to reach only one million and 76 thousand acres.
- The import of 800 thousand tons of Indian rice, of a poor type.
- The price reached ten pounds after the ration price was one and a half pounds.

- The shortage in the governorates of Upper Egypt reached 100% while in Delta it reached 80%.
- Completely lifted from the system of supply goods.
- The crisis will be exacerbated by the coming water disaster caused by Nahda dam in Ethiopia.

Third: **Agricultural fertilizers:**

Agricultural fertilizers in the era of the coup:

- The first price increase on October 13, 2014, from 1400 pounds per ton to 2000 pounds per ton, an increase of 43%.
- The poor farmers were charged an additional 6 billion pounds.
- The second increase in January 2017, from 2000 pounds to 2959 pounds per ton, by 50 %.
- The farmers were charged an additional 10 billion pounds, with a new sales tax imposed 5%.
- The third increase on October 1, 2017 from 2959 pounds per ton to 3200 pounds, an increase of 241 Egyptian pounds.
- The total cost reached 20 billion pounds since October 2014, an increase of 128% than it was during the year of President Mohamed Morsi.

Fourth: **The impact of the coup on the decline of Egyptian exports.**

- Egyptian exports witnessed a continuous decline with the military coup, which in 2012-2013- ranged from 29.339

to 28.735 billion dollars, and then began to decline to 26.771 billion dollars in 2014.

- Total exports decreased in the first half of 2015 to reach \$ 11.225 billion compared to \$ 14.148 billion in the first half of 2014, a decrease of 23%.
- Total exports decreased in the fourth quarter of 2015 to reach \$ 1.429 billion from \$ 5.060 billion in the fourth quarter of 2014, a decrease of 72% over the same period of the previous year.
- The coup regime faced a major crisis due to the declaration of a number of Arab and foreign countries to ban the import of Egyptian crops and food products, which led to increased suffering of Egyptian exports, which is one of the most important sources of foreign currency of the country. The associated labor force accounts for 30.2% of the country's total labor force.

Fifth: The corruption of the structure of the Ministry of Agriculture is getting worse with the military coup.

- Agricultural research centers face a conspiracy to spread corruption in the structure of the Ministry of Agriculture.
- Appointment of the heads of the ministry's bodies from the ex-army generals.
- The Ministry of Agriculture has failed to reclaim land

amounting to 3.2 million feddans by failing to assign the work of the ministry to the business sector companies, which led to the bankruptcy of most of these companies.

- Increase the suffering of the farmers due to the lack of health care and education in villages.
- Poor irrigation system in the old lands, where it merged with sewage and agricultural drainage, which led to the disease of the farmer and his family with hepatitis B and C.

Sixth: the coup and the destruction of agriculture in the absence of agricultural policy.

- The total absence of agricultural programs of raising the awareness of the farmer, and the failure to determine the prices of crops before cultivation, which led to more problems in marketing agricultural crops and affected by fluctuations in international prices did not protect the Egyptian farmer from the international market risks.
- The agricultural economy of the coup suffers from several problems, including the decline in the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the dollar, and the resulting rise in the prices of production inputs, especially the industries that is entirely dependent on raw materials imported from abroad. A large number of factories due to lack of supplies, energy and security disruptions, faced a decline

in production, and consequently a decline in exports, coupled with weak competitiveness of Egyptian products.

Seventh: **Fisheries**

One of the landmarks of the destruction of the fisheries in Egypt, despite thousands of kilometers on the coasts of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, as well as lakes, water bodies and fishponds, the military coup has full control over the management of these lakes and the existence of corrupt leaders where mediation and nepotism and looting of public money prevail.

Eighth: **The poultry industry is the victim of the military coup.**

- The poultry industry is a victim of the corruption of the military coup. Liberalization of exchange rate and its reflection on the costs of production because of the price rise of fodder, and the price rise of diesel necessary to provide heating and the high price of antibiotics needed to treat diseases.
- Monopoly and speculation all this made the price of the kilo rises by 29 pounds according to the latest statistic of 2018 after ranging between 10 - 12 pounds before the coup.

Ninth: **Renaissance Dam**

- The Sisi's approval of the 2015 agreement to continue

the completion of the Renaissance Dam just because he needed legitimacy from Ethiopia on taking over the power in Egypt. That is the biggest betrayal of Egypt and the Egyptian people, by signing political agreements aimed at depriving Egypt of the internationally agreed water quota.

- It is known that the relationship between the Nile basin countries and the quotas of countries in the river water was organized by a series of agreements between the basin countries, including the conventions of 1902, 1929, and 1959. These agreements do not permit unilateral actions on river water.
- The impact on Egypt's share of the Nile water, which is 55 billion cubic meters per year, to reduce it will affect the Egyptian economy. The following is a brief about the implications of the construction of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam through the following aspects:
 - More unemployment due to the loss of a large number of employment opportunities provided by the agricultural sector, which absorbs about 6.5 million workers.
 - Control every drop of water up to Egypt.
 - Deterioration of agricultural productivity and decline in agricultural area.
 - Construction of the dam threatens Egypt not to have water for a year.

- Conversion of Lake Nasser to a pond during the years of construction of the dam.
- A significant reduction in the Egyptian citizen's share of the water, «water poverty line».
- Set-aside of about 2 million acres of agricultural land and the displacement of 4 million families.
- Loss of 24% of agricultural production and food gap increase by 5 billion dollars.
- Increase pollution and threat of fish stocks in the north lakes.
- In case of the collapse of the dam, the results will be catastrophic on the High Dam.
- Problems in drinking water and industry due to low water level.
- The negative impact on River Nile navigation and tourism.



The coup failed to manage the Labor file



The Labor segment is one of the most prominent victims of the coup, their protests represented 45% to 70% of the protests between 2011: 2013 and amounted to more than 5,600 strong protests.

The number of labor protests from 2014 to 2017 in Egypt reached to 4378 protests.

The number of closed factories in 2014 reached 8222 factories and the number doubled thereafter due to import restrictions and the doubling of the prices of raw materials.

The power struggle varied between the amendment of laws, the violent security confrontation, the use of the judiciary to liquidate their protests, and the military crackdowns and trials.

In this regard, we present a sample of the struggle of Egyptian workers for their living and union rights.

Labor protests escalated during the coup.

- Number of protests increased from 1,400 protests in 2011 to 1655 in 2014, according to the Labor Protest Report.
- Decreased to 1117 in 2015, and continued to decline in 2016 as the military tightened its grip on the country to reach 744 protest.

Criticism of international organizations of suppression of the workers of Egypt

As a result of frequent clashes between the labor and the coup regime, they were subject to harsh human rights

criticism by international organizations including:

- International Labor Organization:

In June 2017, Egypt was blacklisted as of countries that carry out violations against workers. The list includes 25

countries, including 5 Arab countries, led by Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Sudan and Mauritania. The coup attempted to bribe the organization to ignore the situation but failed.

- *Amnesty International:*

Amnesty International issued a statement on Labor Day 2017, criticizing the dire situation and crushing of workers by the military soldiers.

- *Human Rights Watch:*

Issued two statements to release the powers of workers and against the law of restricting workers freedoms.

Confrontation of the Trade Unions Law:

One of the most important files related to workers and their rights in Egypt under the coup regime is the «Trade Unions Law» aiming at killing of the labor movement.

- Restricting trade union activity and making it limited to the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions and depriving workers from forming their trade unions out of their own free will.
- Discrimination and inequality in the recognition of the legal personality of semi-official trade unions.
- Non-recognition of regional and sectoral unions.


- Prohibition of the formation of more than one trade union committee for one foundation.
- The formation of the general unions and federations shall be restricted by impossible conditions in respect of the number of members.
- Suppression of the rights of the general assemblies of trade unions.
- Requirements for candidacy for the membership of the boards of directors of trade union organizations are tailored for specific candidates.
- Restrictions of the rules and regulations of trade union elections.

Judiciary and the elimination of trade union freedoms:

- Unfair trials of workers taking part in protests.
- The coup regime pressured the State Council in 2016 to issue an advisory opinion on the illegality of the Ministry of Manpower and Immigration receiving and processing the papers of the independent trade union organizations.
- A lawsuit demanding the abolition of so-called independent trade unions and refusal of their establishment.



Media of the military state .. One voice and multiple restrictions



Media in the military era, figures and violations:

- Closing down of 14 TV channels and 3 newspapers.
- 10 journalists killed during the first two months of the coup and dozens of correspondents wounded during the coverage.
- 300 journalists were arrested, 100 still in custody.
- Break-in of the Syndicate of Journalists for the first time in history.

- Putting to trial of the chief of Journalists Syndicate, its undersecretary and secretary for defending their syndicate.
- The issuance of dozens of publishing bans

Martyrs of the media in the military era:

- *Events of the Republican Guard, 8 July 2013:* Ahmed Assem photographer, (Freedom and Justice) newspaper.
- *In one of the checkpoints of the army July 19, 2013:* Journalist Tamer Abdel Raouf (Al-Ahram)
- *14 August 2013:* 4 journalists: Ahmed Abdul Gawad (Al-Akhbar), Habiba Abdul Aziz (Gulf News UAE), Musab Al Shami (Rassd Network) and Mike Dean (Sky News).
- *Abu Zaabal police car holocaust August 18, 2013:* Mohammed Al-Deeb, TV director.
- *25 January 2014:* Mohamed Helmy and Mustapha Al - Douh.
- *28 March 2014:* Mayada Ashraf, (Al-Dostour).

Media freedom under elected President

Mohamed Morsi:

- The freedom of issuing newspapers by notification and by natural persons.

- Emphasis of the freedom of information and the punishment of those who block it.
- Prevent the closure of newspapers and channels except by a final judicial verdict.
- Ending the guardianship of the ruling authority over the media through the abolition of the Ministry of Information.
- The media exercise their full freedom in criticizing the first elected civilian president without being subjected to confiscation or suspension.
- No imprisonment of any journalist in a publication case.
- The President issued a law prohibiting pre-trial detention in the charge of insulting the President of the Republic.
- Withdrawal of some of the reports submitted by the Legal Department of the Presidency against some journalists and media professionals.
- Intervention to release journalist Shaima Adel in Al Watan newspaper in Sudan

Attempts to return to a single-voice media:

- The coupists in the first moments of their coup stormed the media production city to control all channels and breaking in of several channels and the arrest of crews

during the live broadcast, such as Egypt 25 channel, Fath, Rahma, Al-Nas and Al-Shabab

- Breaking in and closing down of some Arab channels broadcast from Cairo such as Jazeera Arabic and English and several Iraqi and Syrian channels.
- Closing down of the newspapers of (Freedom and Justice) (Al-Shaab) and (Wasla).
- Restrictions on private newspapers supporting the coup in terms of permissible criticism ceiling.
- The restrictions on many pro-coup private channels forcing them to stop many programs and get rid of a number of famous sponsors and broadcasters.
- Blocking more than 450 websites and hundreds of social media pages.
- Launching electronic armies to prosecute and respond to writers and bloggers on social media sites and reporting them to police.
- Establishment of a central command of the media led by Major General Abbas Kamel (Al-Sisi's secretary) assumed the responsibility of managing the media system through direct and indirect guidance.

The grip of the brutal coup regime on official media platforms:

- Not only under the supervision of Major General Abbas Kamel and his men on the media, a number of regulatory bodies have been formed to tighten the control on the media system: the Higher Media Council, the National Press Authority and the National Information Authority and the establishment of a new media association.

Legislations restricting freedom of information during the coup:

- The issuance of the anti-terrorism law, which includes a provision that prevents journalists and media professionals from publishing any information that contradicts the official version, and the penalty of the violators is a fine of half a million pounds.
- The enactment of a law on cybercrime whereby the system will be able to close the news websites under the pretext of endangering public security.
- A law has been issued for the institutionalization of the media bodies and their legal attachment to the executive authority.

Military takeover of important media platforms:

- Closure of the coup power of the opposition channels such as Egypt 25 and youth and Hafiz and Al-Nas.
- The year 2017 witnessed the largest acquisition of private channels and websites by the General and Military Intelligence explicitly under the umbrella of the Egyptian Information Company, and the next step is the entering of current and former army and intelligence officers such as Tariq Ismail, Yasser Salim, Mohammed Samir and even Abbas Kamel personally to the media market by establishing media companies belonging to the General and Military Intelligence Service.



Performance of Public Services and Utilities in the Era of El-Sisi



The importance of the public services and utilities sectors is that they are the real tool to help the economy achieve the required economic growth rates, as well as facilitating the lives of individuals and helping them to carry out their duties towards the community. The more these sectors rely on strong structures, the faster they achieve development goals and vice versa. This is reflected in the Global Competitiveness Index data. In the 2017 / 2018 report, Egypt ranked 71th in the infrastructure sector, out of 137 countries included in the report.

The following are some details of the performance of some sectors and the manifestations of their failure in the Sisi era.

First: **Education sector:**

Expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP

The value is in billion Egyptian pounds

The Year	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018
	Actual		Expected	Targeted
Gross domestic product	2443	2708	2821	4107
Education expenditure	92,2	97,3	103,9	106,5
Percentage of GDP	3,7	3,5	3,6	2,5

Source: Monthly Financial Report of the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, October 2017, p.1, and the analytical statement of the 2017 / 2018 budget, p.102.

Although one of the significant indicators to be accepted in the education sector debate is the percentage of public expenditure on education from GDP.

If we take the first indicator, the percentage of expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP, we find that during the period 2015 / 2016 - 2016 / 2017, it ranged between 3.5%

and 3.7%, and did not witness any tangible development or a boom. However, in 2017/ 2018 the data are either estimated or targeted, and they are not very reliable because they are usually modified, but they are not much different from the performance of the rest of the years.

As for the role of education expenditure in alleviating the unemployment problem, official statistics show that the number of unemployed in Egypt by the end of June 2017 reached 3.4 million, the percentage of unemployed university graduates reached 40.5%, and the percentage of unemployed persons with intermediate qualifications exceeds college graduates, reaching up to 43.6%.

Which means that there is no link between the outputs of educational institutions and labor market needs which weakens the return on spending on education.

Hence, the period of Sisi in power added to the rise and persistence of unemployment rates, on the one hand, and on the other, did not improve the reality of education, and continued to support the failure of educational institutions in preparing graduates for the labor market.

Therefore, we found that the assessment of Egypt's position in the field of labor market efficiency in the Davos Report was very low as usual, with Egypt ranking 134 out of the 137 countries included in the index.

One of the drawbacks of Sisi's education was that the sector became profitable and no longer a message. The armed forces established international schools and university colleges. The Egyptian government refused a Japanese grant to build modern schools for the children of the poor and decided to be schools with fees the thing that made Japan stop the grant. Despite the construction of schools, the project was postponed during the academic year 2017/ 2018 indefinitely.

Second: **Health sector:**

Expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP

The value is in billion Egyptian pounds

The Year	2014 - 2015	2015 - 2016	2016 - 2017	2017 - 2018
	Actual		Expected	Targeted
Gross domestic product	2443	2708	2821	4107
Health expenditure	37,2	43,8	48,9	54,9
Percentage of GDP	1,5	1,6	1,7	1,3

Source: Monthly Financial Report of the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, October 2017, p. 1, and the analytical statement of the 2017/ 2018 budget, p.102.

The table shows that government expenditure on the health sector has increased from EGP 37.2 billion in 2014 / 2015 to LE 48.9 billion in 2016 / 2017 and aims to increase the allocation of the health sector to LE 54.9 billion by the end of June 2018.

Despite the increase in health spending over the period 2014 - 2018, this increase is not keeping up with population growth, and its share of GDP is still weak, ranging between 1.5% and 1.7% from 2014 - 2017. It is expected to fall to 1.3% by the end of June 2018, but may remain at the same rate as previous years, because the value of the target output is exaggerated and does not reflect reality.

There is a government deficit in the Sisi era in terms of hospital spending and management, according to his own statement, acknowledging the state's inability to afford the cost of running hospitals. He called on civil society organizations to contribute to this role. In accordance with the Egyptian Constitution, it is the duty of the state to provide health care to citizens, whether through government institutions or the private sector, but this must take into account the cost of health service provided to citizens in light of the decline in real incomes during the post-coup

era especially after the liberalization of the exchange rate in November 2016, and the poverty rates of about 30% of the population. There are concerns that the social dimensions are not taken into consideration as the foreign private sector enters the market of health services, as has been the case in the UAE by controlling a number of private hospitals and laboratories.

According to statistics from the World Bank database, individuals in Egypt bear a large share of healthcare expenditure, with 55.6% of the total expenditure on health care in 2014, a significant rise, especially after the liberalization of the exchange rate in November 2016, it is expected that the percentage of individuals will increase their expenditure on health care.

World Bank figures show that per capita health care expenditure in 2014 rose to \$ 177.7 at current prices, up from \$ 159.1, an increase of \$ 17 per capita, but due to the health sector's dependence on importation of a significant percentage of the tools and machinery used in health services, as well as medicines, per capita expenditure on health care may exceed \$ 200 after inflation exceeded 35% in August 2017.

Among the negative health indicators in the health sector, according to the World Bank database, the prevalence of malnutrition as a percentage of the population reached 4.5% in 2014, about 4 million people suffering from malnutrition, as the population of Egypt in that year reached 86.7 million. And after food and beverage prices saw a rise of more than 50%, in 2018 the share of the population suffering from malnutrition increased.

Health Insurance Law

In December 2017, the parliament adopted the Health Insurance Law in Egypt, which raised the fears of many concerned with the public affairs, where there will be large segments not covered by the health service. The law depends mainly on workers who have health insurance, which is not available to a large sector of citizens in Egypt, where the agriculture sector employs about 20% of the workforce, or 5.8 million workers, all without social or health insurance, as well as employment in the informal sector in other sectors of economic activity apart from the agricultural sector.

In addition to the economic and social reasons, the law exempted the members of the armed forces, limited the service to the holders of health insurance, as well as

the provision of the law to gradually provide the health insurance service and make the health insurance service for expatriates optional, all of which contravenes the constitution which requires the state to establish a comprehensive health insurance system for all The Egyptians without gradual application, and everyone has equal access to the health insurance system without discrimination.

Third: Housing sector

The housing sector is one of the sectors that have been exposed to the lack of performance of governments in the Sisi era. In his campaign, he adopted the project of establishing 1 million low-income housing units. Such a promise is a measurement of performance, assuming an average of 250,000 units per year during his presidency term. However, the project has been stalled since the announcement of a contract with a company at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference in March 2015 due to the contracting company's inability to provide funding and its desire to obtain project financing from Egyptian banks.

There is a difference between estimates of the size of demand for housing in Egypt, and if we take the lowest estimates, which is 500 thousand housing units, what is accomplished by the

government up to about 15% only, and the rest is done by the private sector, which does not meet the demand for housing, so the housing issue is exacerbated in Egypt.

Thus, the data of the 2017 showed shocking statistics regarding inappropriate housing in cemeteries and riverboats, the presence of a whole family in a room, or the presence of more than one family in one housing unit, and we refer to the following statements of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics in this regard in the census 2017.

	Number of families	Number of persons
Store	21658	77732
Kiosk, cottage or fixed carriage	13572	51851
Yard or cemetery	660	2362
Houseboat	27	115
One or more rooms in a housing unit	306819	2238758
One or more separate rooms	1501049	5913077
Total	1843785	8283895

Source: Data published on the website of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.

As shown in the table above, about 1.8 million families in Egypt live in inadequate housing. These families comprise about 8.2 million people.

The state budget data for 2017 /2018 show that there is a decline in low-income housing subsidies.

Fourth: **Drinking water and sanitation.**

By the end of the fiscal year 2016/2017, public investments in the drinking water and wastewater sector fell to LE 14.4 billion, compared to LE 16.5 billion in 2015 /2016. The share of investments in the sector out of total public investments declined to 2.8% from 4.1% in 2015 /2016.

According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), the number of people benefiting from the public drinking water network is 91.7 million, representing 96.7% of the population, but the point is not in the access to the drinking water network to the large percentage of the population, but it is important that the availability of the network is accompanied by the constant presence of water, which is missed by many areas, especially during the years after the military coup.

Egypt's demand for water in 2017 is estimated at 79 billion cubic meters of water, according to a study by the Central

Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). Egypt has 55 billion cubic meters of water flowing through Egypt. With the population increasing and Egypt's share of the Nile water is fixed, per capita water share reached 600 cubic meters per year, which is below the estimated global poverty level of about 1,000 cubic meters.

In case of Renaissance Dam becomes operational, Egypt will face a major water problem and Egypt might get into extreme poverty of water, with per capita of less than 500 cubic meters of water per year, and the risk of Egypt's declining share of Nile water threatening Egypt in 2018.

Its economic cost will be high, in light of the solutions put forward by the government, represented by the establishment of the army's largest desalination plant.

A new policy followed by the post-coup governments is the providing of goods and services to the people at real prices without any form of subsidy, while ignoring the important aspect that the other side of the equation, which is not achieved is that individuals have the right to real wages. Taking into account the cost of living, as well as annual rates of increase higher than inflation rates. In terms of drinking water and sanitation services, it has been increased

more than once since the coup of 2013, and the last of these increases in August 2017, according to the following table.

Price per cubic meter of drinking water for domestic purposes in Egypt in piastres

The square meter	The old price	The new price	The percentage of increase
0-10	30 piastres	45 piastres	50%
11-20	70 piastres	120 piastres	71.4%
21-30	155 piastres	165 piastres	6,4%

If water consumption increases to 40 cubic meters, the cost is calculated at 200 piasters per meter, and if it exceeds 40 cubic meters, the cost is 215 piasters per meter.

With regard to sewage charges, it is calculated as a percentage of water consumption, and this percentage was raised from 57% to 63%.

While sanitation services cover 83% of Egypt's cities, the share of rural areas is significantly reduced in terms of sanitation services, which cover only 15% of Egypt's villages.

The state strategy foresees sanitary service to reach out to all of Egyptian countryside by 2037. There are Challenges facing the government s delivery of sanitation services to all urban and rural areas, including funding challenges, as well as the financing gap between revenues and expenditures for the public sewerage network.

Sisi's performance in the field of public services is dependent on a new concept: The absence of the economic and social role of the state, and its abandonment of its role towards its members, of providing services as an inherent part of its mission and as a profitable business for the state. People have often blamed the decline in public services, sometimes by talking about population growth, sometimes by the lack of funding and sometimes by successive increases in their salaries.



The Black Book

This book not only brings a lot of evidence of the failure of the military coup in Egypt in the management of the state at all levels, but also reviews the violations committed against this great people so far



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